SHARED PERCEPTIONS OF GREEN? 
The Perception and Acceptance of European Union values and rules in environmental policy in Jordan
The working paper is based on field research that has been conducted between March and May 2011 in Jordan as one of two Mediterranean country studies for the PhD project titled “The perception of the European Union as an environmental actor in the Mediterranean partner countries”. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual conference of the Swiss Political Science Association in Lucerne, 2.-3. February 2012. Many thanks to Matieu Rousselin, Thomas Winzen, Pawel Frankowski and Dirk Lehmkuhl for their helpful comments.
Abstract

The European Union has presented itself as a leading actor in global environmental politics, exporting its values and rules not only into global environmental agreements but also promoting these in their relations with the neighbouring countries to the southern Mediterranean. Academic attention for the promotion and exportation of the EU model has been high and two central debates have emerged, the EU as a normative power and EU external governance which are, as the paper argues, based on the common notion of the EU exporting its model and therefore complementary. While many empirical studies on the concepts exist, the paper argues that an external perspective has been largely disregarded. The paper will therefore give an empirical assessment on how the notion of EU exporting its values and rules is perceived by the recipient country of Jordan.

Keywords: Environmental policy, EU external governance, Normative Power Europe
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1 INTRODUCTION

“We’ve achieved a lot in Europe over the last 10 years. And our environmental policies and legislation are envied and often copied across the world. Climate change, energy targets, waste, emissions or chemicals are all good examples.” (Potočnik 2010)

In recent years the European Union has been representing itself as a vanguard in environmental policy and claims a leading role in global environmental politics. Thus, the EU is committed not only by international agreements and environmental policy regimes, but also by the inclusion of environmental questions and demands in bilateral and multilateral agreements, especially in relations with the countries of its ‘neighborhood’. The EU’s external environmental policy towards the neighbouring countries also contains the promotion and exportation of its values and rules in environmental policy. Values are understood to be more broadly and abstract, and are defined “as notions laden with an absolute (i.e. non-instrumental) positive significance for the overall order and meaning we try to give to our world.” (Lucarelli 2006: 10). Values are then translated into policy action through principles (Lucarelli 2006: 10). While Lucarelli argues for the use of values and principles as a tool for comparison between the EU and other actors of the international system (Lucarelli 2006: 10-1), this paper employs the concept of values to be more abstract and thus accommodate overarching achievements that might be missing in the more concrete concept of principles. These two concepts are nevertheless part of the normative setting of an actor, rules constitute the regulative setting of the actor. While these two settings relate two particular aspects of an actor, they are not independent but rather interdependently relating to one another.

While the institutional side of EU foreign policy has been studied for a long time now, the academic examination of values, principles and rules in EU external relations is a development of the last decade and a half. Academic attention for the exportation of the European Union model has been high and a few vital debates in the disciplines of International Relations and EU studies have emerged, centering on the exportation of EU values and on the extension of EU rules. Emphasizing different dimensions of the EU as an international actor, the concepts of normative power Europe (Manners 2002) and EU external governance (Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2008) do, however, have a common basis – the externalization of the EU’s model. Discussed both theoretically as well as empirically, the two concepts have been examined repeatedly over the last years. The perspective of the vast majority of these contributions has been, however, an EU-centered one, which is quite naturally assumed as the concepts evidently focus on the EU’s external relations and the ability to externalize its model. This perspective has been challenged lately, due to a number of conceptual shortcomings and due to the increase of studies on the external perception of the European Union as international actor (Lucarelli 2007). This paper argues, therefore, that an external perspective promises new insights into how the EU is actually perceived as an environmental actor in Jordan, but also on how the EU externalizing its rules and values is perceived in the recipient country. Also conclusions on the EU’s ability to export its model can be drawn. The empirical case study, consisting of qualitative interviews with environmental experts in Jordan and a complementary quantitative questionnaire, will show that EU values are received quite well in Jordan and that they
have a positive impact on how the EU is perceived as environmental actor and on how the EU’s impact on the environment in Jordan is seen. While the impact of values on the EU’s external perception seems to be high and robust, the impact of EU rules is not as clear.

Following this introduction, the framework for the paper will be set as the European Union as a global and regional environmental actor is presented which includes the EU promoting its values and rules in international agreements and regional cooperation. This notion will be conceptually addressed in the second part of the paper, in which the concepts of normative power and EU external governance are discussed. Here, the notion of the EU externalizing its model is put forward and the worth of an external perspective on this notion is suggested. The third part features the case study of the EU’s perception in Jordan. After a brief overview of the relations between the Union and Jordan, some methodological and conceptual considerations are outlined before the Jordanian perceptions of the EU as environmental actor, EU values and rules, and the impact of the EU are analyzed. It will be argued that values have an impact on how the EU as an actor and the impact of the EU’s activities are perceived. The paper will end with some concluding remarks.
In recent years there have been an increasing number of reflections by EU officials, highlighting the long way the EU has come in terms of external environmental policy. While the early treaties of the European integration project disregarded the topic of the environment at large, the EU has since become very involved in environmental policy, not only within the EU but also on a global scale as it underwent ‘gradual greening process’ (Faulkner 2007: 509). The EU’s standing as an environmental actor on its own is, according to Zito (2005), a ‘by-product’ of the historical evolution of its institutional set, which enhanced the EU’s international profile as well (Zito 2005: 367). Key developments were the creation of a legal basis for the competence in environment with the Single European Act (SEA), the listing of environmental protection as a policy goal (Maastricht Treaty) and the promotion of sustainable development and integration of environmental policy into other policy fields (Amsterdam Treaty). The rise of the European Union in global environmental politics went along with a demise of the United States in this policy field, resulting in the EU and US trading places in global environmental politics (Kelemen/ Vogel 2010). Therefore, despite obstacles in the internal set-up with environment as a field of mixed competence and in the international system for EU as actor, the EU was able to develop “the international standing and the capacity to become an important international actor in the area of international environmental relations.” (Sbragia 2004: 292).

The development of internal environmental policy in the European Union was influenced by societal support, economic interest and institutional background of environmental issues. Building on the internal development, the external dimension environmental policy was made possible by the ERTA ruling at the ECJ in 1971 deciding that internal power must be equaled by external competence (Sbragia/ Damro 1999: 55). Initially economically motivated by the high environmental standards, the European decision makers saw the necessary for the member states and the Commission to focus on international environmental agreements (Sbragia 2004: 278). The transboundary nature of many environmental issues, especially climate change, and addressing these in a global context is another factor enhancing the need for an external environmental policy of the EU. Two less obvious motivations are also at play for the EU to develop a strong agenda in global environmental politics: First, the European Union understood this policy field as an opportunity to enhance its international actorness (Bretherton/ Vogler 2006). This opportunity arose through the gap of leadership the US left after abandoning global change policy (Bretherton/ Vogler 2006: 93). Second, because of its popularity among European citizens, environmental policy has grown to be an important legitimizing factor for an EU identity (Kelemen 2010: 338) and has in consequence become a ‘driver’ for the European integration project (Oberthür/ Roche Kelly 2008: 43-4). Vanden Brande understands this as a kind of ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’: “[A]fter a while the idea of green civilian power was embedded formally and cognitively in the heads of the political elite, academics and the European public. [...] Moreover, the idea of green civilian power Europe is entrenched in the feeling of European identity.” (Vanden Brande 2009: 176). This relevance of environmental policy for the European Union’s external and internal identity has also been underlined by EU officials.
As environmental policy is apparently very important to the European Union for a number of reasons, the representation of the EU as a global environmental actor has been of interest in the academic literature as well. The European Union is often characterized as a leader in global environmental politics and has been discussed much in the academic debate, especially in connection with climate policy. The concept of leadership has been examined by Grupp/Gupta (2000) who then favoured directional leadership, described as leading by example, to be the EU’s ‘natural role’ (Grupp/Gupta 2000: 20-1). This understanding of the EU as a directional or soft leader is still strong as this relates to the instruments available to the EU (Oberthür/Roche Kelly 2008: 36-7), is reflected in the self-presentation of the EU (Schreurs/Tiberghien 2007) and is generally perceived by outsiders (Kilian/Elgström 2010). The idea of EU leadership has not only been discussed in the academic literature, but has also been quite happily received in EU official discourse (European Commission 2009). Quite characteristic for the European Union in environmental politics are, however, also inconsistencies and incoherencies between declaratory intent and policy implementation (Baker 2006, Vogler 2007: 391-2) and between actions in different policy fields (Vanden Brande 2009: 171). This does have implications for the EU externalizing its rules and values as well, Baker points out: "Until these issues are resolved, the gap will remain between, on the one hand, the values embedded in the declaratory political intent and Treaty obligations of the EU, and, on the other, the ability of the EU to see its values and principles through policy implementation." (Baker 2006: 95).

Another important aspect of the EU’s representation in global environmental politics is the promotion and export of EU values and rules, which has also received much attention both in the academic debate and official EU discourse. Hence, the significance of the Union in global environmental politics is not limited to a direct contribution but indirectly adding as a disseminator of its norms (Vogler 2005: 841) and exercising regulatory influence to promote EU environmental standards (Kelemen 2010: 336). Recorded in the Treaty of Lisbon of the Union, a need for sustainable development of the Earth (art 3) is expressed as a guide for policy formulation both within the EU and in its external activities and is thus an indicator for the prominence of environmental values in the EU. This is also underlined in various instances by EU officials as the example of Jose Barroso’s speech on ‘A Europe of values’ illustrates: "I would add a special concern for the environment, because, in addition to the obligations we have to our fellow human beings, we are also increasingly aware of the obligations we have to our planet and future generations." (Barroso 2009). Acting on the environmental obligations, the EU has supported and ‘empowered’ international environmental institutions and thus multilateralism in the field of environmental policy (Oberthür/Roche Kelly 2008: 43f). These multilateral channels were also used to promote more general principles, examples being sustainable development and the integration of environmental concerns into the WTO international trading system (Kelemen/Vogel 2010: 428), and specific principles like the precautionary principle, which is argued to be the main difference to the US’ environmental values (Baker 2006: 85). In sum, the EU is often as a distinct international actor in environmental policy, especially in comparison to the US (Baker 2006, Kelemen/Vogel 2010).

In line with the general (self-) representation of the EU as a leading environmental actor, the countries of the Union’s neighbourhood were also addressed regarding this policy
field: "The EU has much experience in addressing environmental problems in the Mediterranean [...]. The EU can also share approaches that have been successful in different parts of Europe with all of the countries in the Mediterranean, adapted to their socio-economic contexts." (European Commission 2006: 6). True to the EU’s intentions, the EU has provided ample support for an environmental cooperation with the southern Mediterranean countries. While the situation of the eastern European countries with a membership perspective was quite different, the EU is still setting incentives for a closer environmental cooperation and has succeeded in so far as the policy field has been included in all major macro-structural initiatives (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy and Union for the Mediterranean). This is also reflected in the institutional landscape as Costa comments: “There is no shortage of institutions and grand commitments to promote environmental policy convergence in the Mediterranean region.” (Costa 2010: 149). Despite the stated intentions, the institutional structure and well suited instruments promoting general EU rules (Costa 2010: 155), the impact of the EU is still in question, the nature of environmental policy as a peripheral topic being a grand obstacle (Buzogany/ Costa 2009: 529).

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1 Vogler notes that enlargement is the biggest contribution to global sustainable development although the enlargement to EU25 has both increased its global weight and internal complexities (Vogler 2005: 842).
3 EU EXTERNALIZATION OF RULES AND VALUES

The notion of the European Union as an exporter and promoter of values, principles and rules is a much debated one both in the academic field and official EU discourse. This may be to a certain degree due to the high visibility of this notion, as the EU talks quite openly about the promotion of values and principles and is rather explicit in the promotion of its rules: "And as a Union built on shared values, we want our neighbours to benefit from the stability and prosperity that come with open and democratic society and the rule of law." Catherine Ashton says in the Communication of the EU marking the 5th anniversary of the ENP, which is to demonstrate the "clear benefits that the European Union brings to its neighbours." (European Commission 2010b)

Academic attention for the exportation of the European Union model has been high and a few vital debates in the disciplines of International Relations and EU studies have emerged, centering on the exportation of EU values and on the extension of EU rules. Two concepts seem to have gotten a bigger share of attention: The notion of the EU as a normative power basing its external actions on values and influencing perceptions of normal in international relations (Manners 2002), and the concept of EU external governance which focuses on the extension of internal rules and policies beyond formal membership (Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig 2009: 791). It is argued in this paper that the two concepts are compatible thus presenting the notion of the EU model externalization, which is understood here as the EU externalizing beyond the EU’s institutional boundaries its model that consists of rules and values that have been developed or adopted internally and thus aiming for an approximation of third countries with EU rules and values. This understanding is based on the common assumption of the two concepts of EU external governance and normative power that the European Union exports and promotes those rules (in the case of EU external governance) and values (in the EU normative power case) that originate in the EU or are internally adopted.

3.1 Normative Power Europe

The academic debate about norms and values in EU external activities was often fueled by the EU’s stated objectives of promoting its values and rules into contexts outside of the Union. Several authors have pointed to the relevant of norms and values for EU external activities, but the main, still on-going debate has been started with Ian Manners’ notion of ‘Normative Power Europe’ (2002). In the article ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ Manners argues for a change in the debate about the international role of the EU towards the "ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role as representing normative power." (Manners 2002: 238). Manners sees the EU’s normative difference based on its historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution where constitutive norms determine the EU’s international identity, which therefore predisposes the EU to be a normative power: "The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics." (Manners 2002: 252). This normative basis of the EU does not automatically make the EU a normative power, as it must diffuse.
(through different mechanisms) its norms and thus “shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations.” (Manners 2002: 239).

Manners’ article ignited a lively and often controversial debate about normative power, in which three broad focal points emerged relating to the three main aspects of the concept: The construction of normative power, the EU as an actor based on norms, and the EU as an actor promoting norms.

In the first sub-debate the construction of normative power and the relevance of this concept for the construction of an EU identity is discussed (De Zutter/Toro 2008, Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007, Pace 2007, Diez 2005, Diez/Manners 2007). While Nicolaidis/Howse (2002) argue that not the EU is promoted but rather a reflection of what it wants to be (‘EUtopia’), they highlight a different aspect of the construction of normative power than Diez, who emphasizes the differentiation and ‘othering’ through the concept of normative power (Diez 2005). The necessity for reflexivity, and lack thereof, is often pointed out in this strand of the debate (Diez 2005, Diez/Pace 2007, Manners 2006, Nicolaidis/Howse 2002, Bicchi 2006). More explicitly, Diez points out that the “discourse of the EU as a normative power constructs a particular self of the EU (and it is indeed perhaps the only form of identity that most of the diverse set of actors within the EU can agree on), while it attempts to change others through the spread of particular norms.” (Diez 2005: 614). The academic and official discourses are therefore reproducing themselves.

The second strand of debate investigates the EU’s ability to “act in a normative way” (Manners 2002: 252) which includes the EU’s predisposition to act in such a way and the EU’s ability to base (external) actions on values and norms. In respect to the EU’s predisposition, the distinctiveness of the EU as international actor is considered (Hyde-Price 2006), also in comparison to other (possible) normative powers (Tocci 2008), especially the US (Diez 2005). A considerable number of publications examine the supposed normative base of EU external policies (including the EU’s interests as well as actual behavior) in different regional circumstances and in different policy fields, although ‘normative’ policy fields such as democratization and human rights dominate the literature. While Forsberg argues for normative power to see understood as an ideal type\(^2\) and the EU as approximating this more than other actors (Forsberg 2011), he is one of few arguing in favor of the EU acting as a normative power\(^3\). A considerable number of empirical publications have argued against the notion of the EU acting as a normative power, mainly due to incoherence between declaration and action and inconsistency between external activities (Martinez 2008, Johansson-Nogués 2007). Critically received is also the force-for-good connotation (Zutter 2010: 1107) as the actions and instruments of a normative power can be coercive (Sjursen 2006, Brummer 2009). In addition, normative action can also be motivated by strategic interests (Youngs 2004).

The EU’s ability to shape and promote values and norms is the focal point of the third strand of the debate on normative power. This relates to normative power as “ability to

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\(^2\) Forsberg suggests normative power as an ideal type with a distinction between normative identity, interests, behavior, means of influence and achievements (Forsberg 2011).

\(^3\) Other instances are Nunes 2011, Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007.
cause effects”, rather than power “as a powerful actor” (Forsberg 2011: 8). This ability to shape values and thus cause effects is understood here as an active or passive (Huber 2010) process conducted by the European Union. A number of scholars have argued this ability to diffuse norms and values to be a defining feature of a normative power identity (Zutter 2010: 1114, Sjursen 2006). Even more concrete, Manners rephrased his main point of the NPE concept in a recent article, asking: “To what extent is the European Union (EU) a normative power with the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in a globalised world?” (Manners 2008, #23). The issue of norms diffused or promoted has, however, also been criticized as the norms suggested by Manners are not consensual: neither their universality nor their assumed moral ‘goodness’ are undisputed (Diez 2005, Merlinger 2007, Sjursen 2006, Hyde-Price 2006). There are few examples of empirical literature focusing on this characteristic of normative power (Lightfoot/ Burchell 2005, Björkdahl 2005).

The concept of normative power Europe, triggered by Manners in 2002, is thus still debated actively and controversially. While some have outright objected to such a notion, others have criticized the concept on a number of issues: Most often, normative power is criticized for its conceptual vagueness, lacking a clear-cut definition and being all-embracing it seems thus lacking analytical accuracy (Sjursen 2006) but being rather prescriptive (Manners 2006) and accompanied by a normativity that is more concerned about what the EU should look like rather than what it is (Zutter 2010: 1107). Another serious point of critique is raised by Wichmann who points out the lack of explanations of normative power, instead debating the characteristics of normative power (Wichmann 2010: 21) and thus conceptual issues at large. Therefore, empirical literature on normative power is lacking (Wichmann 2010), also due to the challenges in operationalizing the concept.

3.2 EU external governance

The concept of EU external governance examines the externalizing of EU regulatory structures beyond the institutional boundaries of the EU’s territory (Lavenex 2004: 683). The concept is therefore defined: “It is this extension of internal rules and policies beyond formal membership that the notion of external governance seeks to capture [...]” (Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009: 791). The expansion of external governance by the EU is influenced by the recent enlargement of 2004 and 2007, growing interdependence with

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4 Tocci (2008) emphasizes the point that only major international actors have the ability (or power) to shape norms, but that indeed all of these major actors have thus a ‘normative’ foreign policy by definition (Tocci 2008: 4).

5 The five core norms (peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights) and four minor norms (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance) Manners identifies are a source of legitimacy for the EU. In addition, these norms are quite consistent with the EU’s as expressed in the Treaty of Lisbon.

6 Merlinger even argues that by promoting EU values it disables the agency of recipients.

7 Zutter 2010 actually developed methodological steps to study normative power empirically.
neighbouring countries and the external effects (increasing EU competence) of EU integration (Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig 2009: 793). Frequently the importance of enlargement for the development of EU external governance has been emphasized as there arose a necessity to formulate a policy towards the neighbouring countries as alternative to enlargement, which was the initial instrument to create security and stability in the European Union (Lavenex 2004: 681). This new policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), on the other hand, follows the rationale of enlargement as it aims at the transfer and adaption of EU rules and policies (Tulmets 2007).

Unlike the debate on normative power Europe, there was not one particular publication attributed as the beginning of the debate. The external dimension of governance is embedded in the research field of European (internal) governance, which is a form of political organization between government and cooperation (Lavenex 2004: 682) is often argued to be distinctive from national or global governance models (Farrell 2005: 457). This approach also offers an added-value to the study of EU external relations, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 658) argue. The rise of the debate about EU external governance also drew strength from the newly established ENP, which fits the characteristics of external governance quite well and has often been analyzed within this framework (Casier 2011, Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig 2011, Wichmann 2010, Freyburg et al. 2009, Tulmets 2007). Overall, the concept has been discussed in recent years, without however raising such a highly controversial debate as the normative power concept did. The academic debate on external governance is not as broad and is less focused on conceptual issues, mainly for the clarity of the definition of the concept. On the other hand, there is a higher number of empirical applications of the concept, to the neighbouring regions of the EU, also including relations with European Non-EU countries.

Structuring the debate, there are three major aspects of external governance concept: export of rules – relating to what is being exported and modes of governance – relating to how it is exported (Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2004: 662), and effectiveness (and conditions) of external governance as a third aspect.

The content of EU rules promotion depends, of course, on the policy field in question. In general terms, most publications take the EU acquis communautaire as the starting point for their analysis. Barbé et al (2009) on the other hand argue that the promotion of EU rules has been overemphasizes as there are other rules and norms (international and bilateral ones) that are also promoted in policy convergence (Barbé et al 2009: 382). Regardless of the actual content of rule promotion, a strong codification of the rules promoted has a positive impact on the effectiveness of rule adoption (Freyburg et al 2009).

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8 There is a number of quite influential publications about external governance as a special issue of JEPP Vol 11 (2004): 4 was published which lay the foundations for explicit research on external governance (Schimmelfennig/ Wagner; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier, Lavenex and others).

9 Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig have even included the acquis in the central conception of external governance: “External governance refers to institutionalized relationships with non-member (and non-candidate) countries such as the ENP countries, in which the partner countries commit themselves to approximate their domestic policies and legislation to the EU acquis.” (Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig 2011: 896).
Regarding the modes of governance, a general distinction has been made between modes associated with macro-structures of external governance (such as the European Neighbourhood Policy) consisting of hierarchical, market and network governance, and sectoral modes of external governance, which Lavenex et al (2009) locate at a meso-level (Lavenex et al 2009: 815)\(^\text{10}\). Hierarchical governance assumes a vertical, asymmetrical relationship between rulers and ruled and relates to issues highly integrated and enforceable (Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig 2009: 797). Hierarchical governance is the mode of enlargement, associating EU rule transfer with certain (credible) external incentives granted by the EU, membership being the most attractive one, and therefore governing by conditionality (Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2004). This mode is also found in the policy transfer agenda of the ENP (Kelley 2006). In the empirical testing of the modes of governance, hierarchical governance is often found to be the most influential and robust mode (Knill/ Tosun 2009: 889, Schimmelfennig/ Scholtz 2008). It is, however, not always applicable as the reward as to exceed the cost of adaption to EU rules. Network governance is based on the notion of (formally) equal actors\(^\text{11}\) and characterized by shared and frequent horizontal coordination which is then a “favourable context for mechanisms of influence based on socialization, social learning and communication [...]” (Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig 2009: 798). Often viewed as a 'softer’ (Knill/ Tosun 2009: 877) alternative to the hierarchical mode of governance, this mode can take into account the recipient countries’ structures and elite networks and can therefore have a positive impact on the legitimacy and subsequently on the likelihood of adopting EU rules (Knill/ Tosun 2009: 890). This mode of governance is the predominant one in the export of EU rules in environmental policy, as Knill/ Tosun suggest, and is seen as an alternative when hierarchical governance is not applicable (Knill/ Tosun 2009: 890-1). Market governance is the third mode of external governance where regulatory competition between actors is the motor of adapting to EU rules. Therefore, access to the European market can serve as an important instrument for approximating or harmonizing EU standards. According to Knill/ Tosun, this is of no great importance regarding the adoption of EU environmental rules in non-member countries (Knill/ Tosun 2009: 890). As a fourth mode of external governance, and thus far the only one located at a meso-level, Lavenex et al (2009) have proposed sectoral governance. While overarching macro-institutional structures (EMP, ENP) have little influence on approximation (Lavenex et al 2009: 814), external modes of sectoral governance largely reflect internal sectoral dynamics and are relatively stable in influence across different countries (Lavenex et al 2009: 830), thus performing a kind of functional cooperation. In the field of democracy promotion by the EU, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2011) locate the approach “[l]ess top-down than leverage and less bottom-up than linkage” thus embedding EU rules and (in this case democratic principles) in the sectoral cooperation, characterized by “transgovernmental, horizontal ties between the EU and third countries’ public administrations.” (Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig 2011: 887). This ap-

\(^{10}\) Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig (2011) have, regarding EU democracy promotion, distinguished between linkage (network governance), leverage (hierarchical governance) and governance (sectoral governance).

\(^{11}\) This assumption does not, however, rule out the possibilities of power asymmetries (Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig 2009: 797).
proach appears to be an interesting addition to the concept of EU external governance as environmental policy is an example for sectoral cooperation.

Another aspect of the concept and subsequent field of empirical research is the effectiveness of EU external governance, which has often been neglected (Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009: 800). To assess the effectiveness of external governance, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009: 800-1) suggest a distinction between rule selection (the extent of EU rules as normative reference points in third countries), rule adoption (transfer into domestic legislation) and rule application (acted upon in political and administrative practice). The line is consecutive meaning that rule adoption builds on rule selection and rule application on adoption and selection. Empirically, the relation between selection, adoption and application is quite challenging as recent research by Freyburg et al (2009) has suggested that there is a discrepancy between rule adoption and rule application: “whereas the EU has been fairly successful in inducing the three ENP countries to adopt legislation in line with democratic governance provisions, these provisions have generally not been implemented." (Freyburg et al. 2009: 926). Explanations for the effectiveness of EU external governance have recently been discussed in a special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy and several factors influencing the effectiveness were put forward – the internal EU modes of governance (Lavenex et al 2009), the bargaining power of the EU (Youngs 2009) and the domestic structure of the recipient countries (Barbé et al 2009). In detail, Barbé et al argue that along with incentives and coherency, the rules promoted by the EU must be perceived as legitimate in the recipient countries (Barbé et al 2009: 390). This paper will take up this point and further address the domestic context of the recipient country as this appears that this has been largely overlooked in the existent literature.

Missing the controversial character of the debate on normative power, the critique on the concept of EU external governance is not as fundamental. The concept has been, however, criticized by scholars favoring policy convergence, arguing that the concept is too narrowly focused on the promotion of EU rules, which are not as dominant in policy convergence as they are only one set out of three – international and bilaterally agreed rules being the others, which are as relevant as the EU is not always the institution setting the standards. The EU-centrism of the research is also emphasized by Casier, who criticizes the absence of domestic factors explaining the variation in rule transfer (Casier 2011: 39). In addition, Barbé et al argue, the concept implies a unilateral relation between (norm-)maker and (norm-)taker (Barbé et al 2009: 379 – 382). A lack of perception of rule transfer in the ENP as a factor of subjectivity is also pointed out by Casier (Casier 211: 39).

12 Definition of policy convergence (Knill 2005: 768) “any increase in the similarity one or more characteristics of a certain policy (e.g. policy objectives, policy instruments, policy settings) across a given set of political jurisdictions (supranational institutions, states, regions, local authorities) over a given period of time”.11
3.3 Capturing the externalization of EU values and rules

The discussion of the concepts of normative power Europe and EU external governance shows that these are not competing but rather easily compatible, as they are both incorporate aspects that emphasize the notion of the externalization of the model EU. Departing from this common basis, the two concepts accentuate complementary dimension of externalization – the extension of internal rules and projection of values to external policies, which reflect the internal organization and values of the EU (Bicchi 2006, Zutter 2010: 1111).

The notion of externalization of EU values is seemingly more problematic for scholars of the normative power Europe concept as it might diminish the claims of EU distinctiveness, seeing that the EU might be thrown in with other ‘normative powers’ such as the US (and to some degree China and Russia, c.f. Zielonka 2011, Tocci 2008), that export and promote their values beyond their institutional boundaries.

Despite these considerations, the notion of the EU externalizing its model is still put forward in this paper as the term ‘externalization’ should not hold any implications as to how values and rules are extended. It does seem beneficial, however, to have a concept that considers both rules and values and that underlines the strong common basis of the two concepts involved.

The notion of EU model externalization seems to be quite suitable to be applied to the framework of environmental policy in Jordan introduced in the first part of the paper since both the policy field as well as the geographical scope have often been addressed in prior research.

Jordan being a part of the European Union’s policies and initiatives towards neighbouring countries in the southern Mediterranean, the region has been a testing field for both concepts discussed above. The ENP has been discussed to a large extent as a frame to export EU rules, but also in connection to the promotion of EU values and principles. While being examined in a high number of publications, the countries of the southern Mediterranean are not the poster child for EU external governance. Regarding the EU’s ability to extend its regulatory boundaries to the countries of the south Mediterranean, two limitations apply: First, the lack of a membership perspective, since the ENP is set up as an alternative to membership, decreases the incentives necessary for conditionality and therefore to externalize EU rules through hierarchical means (Youngs 2009, Buzogany/ Costa 2009, Costa 2010). Second, as a high number of Mediterranean economies including the Jordanian do not largely depend on the European Union and its internal market (Bendiek 2008), chances for market governance are very slim. Network and sectoral governance were, on the other hand, observed in the Mediterranean framework (Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig 2011, Costa 2010). Being addressed through the lens of the normative power concept, the EU’s relation with the Mediterranean countries has been examined as well, although mainly in a less favorable way by focusing on the inability of the EU to ei-

13 “The key factors that explain the effectiveness of convergence efforts are to be found in the relationship between the environmental administrations of the EU and those of third countries, and between the latter and other more powerful national bureaucracies.” (Costa 2010: 163).
ther base foreign policies on norms (Martinez 2008, Powel 2009) or effectively promote these (Seeberg 2009, Kelley 2006).

Environmental policy, as the policy field of question in this paper, has been examined within the framework of normative power Europe and EU external governance as well. Normative power tends to emphasize the importance of environmental policy as it is a ‘normative’ policy field (Kelemen 2010: 338) and the Union has even been termed ‘green normative power’ (Faulkner 2007: 508). Although the account of the EU being a normative, environmental actor is not uncontroversial, this notion still prevails, also in the self-representation of the EU. Also within the framework of external governance, environmental policy was examined and found to be an example for network and sectoral governance (Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig 2011: 887). However, the relevance of environmental policy not as a major but as a ‘fringe’ topic (Costa 2010) limits the promotion of EU rules and values since it restricts the modes/strategies available for convergence (Costa 2010: 156).

Overall, prior research is not all consistent and no clear direction for this paper regarding the combination of geographical scope and policy field is indicated. The framework of environmental policy in Jordan does, however, seem suitable to further research in this field.

Complementing the several points of criticism already presented in the discussion of the two concepts, there is one point that generally applies to both of them - the EU dominated perspective of both concepts. While the necessity to put the EU into the focus of concepts that are studying the EU’s external relations and ability to externalize its model is evident, this perspective has been quite persistent despite various authors pointing out the shortcomings. These consist of the lack of reflexivity (Diez 2005: 635, Manners/ Diez 2007: 175) and the concept being ‘inward-looking’ (Wichmann 2010: 21). In addition, the concepts were criticized for being Eurocentric (Nicolaidis/ Howse 2002: 771, Sjursen 2006: 248, Casier 2011: 39), hegemonial (Hyde-Price 2006: 227), neo-imperialist (Jo- hansson-Nogués 2007: 184) and generally assuming asymmetrical relations between the EU and the recipient country (Barbé et al 2009: 381, Parmentier 2008). A number of authors have, on the other hand, addressed the importance of the recipient country for the success and effectiveness of the EU externalizing its rules and values. Both Wichmann and Zutter highlight the necessity of inclusion in the concept of normative power: “The inclusion of others is crucial: a normative power identity depends on the recognition of others, and successful norm-diffusion results in other entities adopting practices that are in line with its norms.” (Zutter 2010: 1114). As for the concept of external governance, the relationship between the EU and the recipient is often seen as unidirectional with a clear distinction between rule/norm-maker and rule/norm-taker: “The

14 This connection has been further addressed in a number of studies (Burchell/ Lightfoot 2005, Scheipers/ Sicurelli 2007, Van den Brande 2009).

15 Concept ‘inward-looking’ (Wichmann 2010: 21) meaning that empirical literature is more interested in the motivation and policy-goals underlying the EU’s promotion of values and less on external factors that can affect this promotion of norms and values (Wichmann 2010: 21-22).

16 Wichmann (2010: 215) concludes her study by pointing out that “the mere projection of EU normative power says very little about the implementation of the norms in the partner countries.”
role of the outsiders is then reduced to a mere object more often than not subjected to EU-defined rules and norms.” (Barbé et al. 2009: 382). Lavenex and Schimmelfennig have, however, recently pointed out the crucial role of recipient countries who do decide on what policies to cooperate with the EU (Lavenex/ Schimmelfennig 2011: 887) and not passively absorb them, as Parmentier notes: “Similarly, the norms reception process in the neighbouring states should not be understood as a passive absorption of norms and values through various mechanisms (as conditionality), because the neighbours can confront, accept or avoid them.” (Parmentier 2008: 115).

Considering an external perspective on the notion of EU model externalization takes both critical points raised above into account and promises to be thus of value: First, an external perspective on the EU’s externalization of its model can overcome major points of criticism of Eurocentrism and lack of reflexivity. Secondly, assessing how EU rules and values are perceived in recipient countries can contribute to analyzing the effectiveness or success of EU model externalization.

Addressing exactly this shortcoming of the external perspective on the EU in the literature, the approach of studying external perceptions of the European Union has in recent years attracted some attention (Lucarelli 2007, Lucarelli/ Fioramonti 2009, Chaban/ Elgström Holland 2006, Elgström 2007). The analytical perspective of external perception is combined with different theoretical backgrounds, EU identity formation (Lucarelli 2009, Lucarelli/ Fioramonti 2009), role theory (Elgström/ Smith 2006) and EU actorness (Rhodes 1998, Bretherton/ Vogler 1999/2006) to name a few. There are also few studies assessing external perceptions on the EU as a normative power as well (Huber 2010, Harpaz/ Shamis 2010, Zutter/ Toro 2008). This is even more astonishing since EU officials often voice the outsiders’ views of the EU as extremely positive, as an example and an actor in demand: “The reputation of the EU in the world is a good one, based on our strong values of freedom and democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. We already speak with conviction and clarity on the major challenges that face us, be they climate change, or fighting poverty, conflict or terrorism.” (Ashton 2009).

To conclude on the argumentation presented above, the notion of EU model externalization emphasizes the extension of both the EU’s regulative model (rules) and normative model (values) beyond the institutional boundaries. Although there are mixed results of prior research, the framework of environmental policy in Jordan promises to be of interest. Further is was argued that an external perspective on the EU’s externalization can overcome major shortcomings of the two concepts of normative power and EU external governance and also suggests new impetus for assessing the effectiveness of EU externalizing its rules and values.

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17 Huber (2010) examines the perception of the EU as a normative power in Palestine. Harpaz/ Shamis (2010) analyse the EU’s normative power through an Israeli lens. DeZutter/ Toro (2008) study the EU’s identity as a normative power in the WTO.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been a partner country of the European Union since the signing of a cooperation agreement with the then EEC (European Community) in 1978. Since then relations between Jordan and the EU have increased especially with the general upgrading of relations between the EU and southern Mediterranean countries in 1995 by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), where the Mediterranean was constructed and acknowledged as a shared space in need of close cooperation in a number of issues to promote and strengthen a region of peace, security and prosperity through political dialogue and cooperation and based on shared values (European Commission 1995). This multilateral framework of cooperation was complemented by the bilateral Association agreements, building on prior economic relations between the EU and the individual Mediterranean. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership whose results were rather mixed as the objectives of promoting peace, security and prosperity were not significantly met (Del Sarto/ Schumacher 2005: 17), was hence updated by the Union for the Mediterranean (UMed) in 2008. Being less politicized and more focused on concrete, visible projects, the Union for the Mediterranean reaffirmed the original objectives of the Barcelona Process while stressing the shared responsibility (co-ownership) of the process and addressed cooperation in a higher number of policy fields, including environmental policy with the aim of translating “translate the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration into tangible results.” (European Commission 2008).

A second multilateral framework policy was introduced in 2004. As the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’, it targeted not only neighbouring countries to the south but also to the east, while at the same time, attempting to pursue a ‘tailored’ cooperation approach with each country. The focus of the ENP differed from the EMP’s approach as it included greater commitment from both sides and was rather explicit on the objective of exporting the European model into neighbourhood region: “The novelty of the ENP did not so much lie in the high normative component of the new policy – democracy, human rights, the rule of law had arguably also been part of many previous EU external policies. The originality of the ENP was rather its forceful language in terms of political conditionality.” (Johansson-Nogués 2007: 182). This was, however, not negatively perceived: Kelley (2006) notes that Jordan, for example, was enthusiastic about the ENP because it “aligns very well with Jordan’s own initiated national reform agenda both in content and timetable.” (Kelley 2006: 45)

Therefore, over the years of collaboration in the different multilateral framework initiatives and bilateral cooperation, Jordan has been a reliable partner country and has been acknowledged as such: “Jordan has become an increasingly significant player, a regional actor and a key interlocutor for the European Union in the Middle East,” said HR Catherine Ashton in the wake of the 9th EU-Jordanian Association Council’s meeting (European Commission 2010) which resulted in the announcement of the ‘advanced status’ of the partnership. This ‘advanced status’ mainly reflects the rather satisfying cooperation for

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18 The ENP’s Action Plan is based on the ‘Jordan First’ reform program initiated by King Abdullah II, thus promising to be rather wide in its objectives of political reform (Del Sarto/ Schumacher 2011: 940), and quite embedded in the Jordanian context.
the EU, especially in comparison to other Mediterranean countries, as Jordan is advancing in its economic and social development. Through the introduction of modern political institutions an appearance of reforms in the political realm has also been given (Lust-Okar 2009: 5), which satisfies the European Union for now: “The EU values Jordan as a very important partner in both the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean and is committed to strengthening and further developing a close, constructive and mutually beneficial partnership with Jordan.“ (European Commission 2010). In addition, the EU’s efforts of promotion of values, principles and rules fell on rather fertile ground as King Abdullah’s vision of Jordan’s development (Jordan Times 2011) is very much in line with international expectations (Lust-Okar 2009: 5) in general and with the major objectives of cooperation between the EU and Jordan in particular.

Environmental policy has been a part of this EU-Jordanian relationship and has been undergoing some dynamics both in the Jordanian environmental politics and the European support to institutionalization and implementation. The development of the cooperation between Jordan and the European Union regarding environmental issues parallels the general development as presented above. While there were a few passages mentioning environmental issues in the EEC-Jordan cooperation agreement, the bilateral Association Agreement, which was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 2002, was more elaborate on environmental issues, which were still closely connected to economic cooperation and trade. Although the Agreement includes some remarks about approximating laws and standards, this is not the main issue in this agreement. It was after the conclusion of the Association Agreement that environmental cooperation mainly picked up momentum with establishing the Ministry of Environment and a number of sectoral policy cooperation such as Horizon 2020 (2005) and the EU’s environmental strategy for the Mediterranean (2006). The Action Plan of the ENP dwells on this dynamic development (adopted in January 2005) and focuses more on the question of harmonization and promotion of European values, principles and rules. In general, environment was taken out of the economic area and now constitutes a new area\(^9\) of cooperation with three main objectives: improving the structures for environmental policy and thus the management of environment, taking action in protecting the environment, and enhancing cooperation on environmental issues, regionally and internationally (European Commission 2005). In line with the general objective of approximation the Action Plan implicitly aims for convergence in the field of environmental policy as well, in supporting administrative structures, highlighting the importance of environmental policy integration and pointing out the implementation of international environmental agreements. Similar to the general cooperation with the European Union, the cooperation in the policy field of environment fell on rather fertile ground in Jordan. There have been a number of reforms in the institutional set-up and in legislative frame which supported and praised as a ‘best practice’ example of the ENP. Particularly in the development of the legal and institutional framework, the Ministry of Environment was applauded as a “model for other public administrations.”, working efficiently on “mainstreaming environment in other policies, such as trade and transport, conducting environmental impact assessments, and investing in strengthened enforcement of environmental laws.” (European Commission 2007)

\(^{9}\) Along with transport, energy, information society
All together, the cooperation between Jordan and the European Union proceeds quite well as Jordan adheres, at least superficially, to political and economic reforms as was aimed by the Union. The promotion of EU values, principles and rules is widely included in the policy documents such as the Action Plan and are underlying the support the EU offers in environmental cooperation as well. The environmental cooperation between Jordan and the EU is in line with this general development as Jordan carries out reforms in the institutional set-up and legislative frame, which are also supported by the EU. Despite environmental policy still not being a central of cooperation, it has increased in importance, which is noticeably reflected in the development of environmental cooperation in the general framework of EU-Mediterranean relations and in bilateral ties with Jordan. Jordan is, therefore, a valuable case study for assessing the reception and perception of EU values, principles and rules which the EU promotes through cooperation as Jordan is considered a ‘poster child’ in the ENP cooperation in general and in environmental issues.

4.1 Conceptual and methodological considerations

Building on the common aspect of the concepts of normative power and EU external governance, namely the EU externalizing its model in the appearance of EU rules and values, and considering the little empirical research that has been conducted so far, this paper is rather exploratory in nature. Rather than testing well-formulated hypothesis which would be based on prior research conducted and thus, at least indirectly, reflect the dominant EU-perspective, the empirical part will encounter and analyzes the perceptions of the EU model externalization openly. Four main guiding questions will, however, frame the analysis: How are main EU values perceived? How is the notion of EU exporting rules received? How is the impact of the European Union for environmental issues in Jordan seen? Are there shared perceptions of values and rules? These questions relate, obviously, to the two concepts introduced in the theoretical part of the paper. Besides the notion of externalizing the EU’s model (rules and values), another common aspect is the impact the European Union has with its externalizing on recipient countries.

The empirical part of the paper therefore attempts to assess the perception of the EU externalizing its rules and values in the field of environmental policy in Jordan. Research was carried out between March and May 2011 in Jordan. Overall, 29 semi-structured interviews with environmental experts from administration, civil society and research institutions were conducted. Excluding non-Jordanians, there were 24 experts who also filled out a closed questionnaire as complementary data. The participation in the interviews and questionnaire was on a voluntary basis. As the qualitative method of expert interview does require openness, the questions focused mainly on the perception of the situation of the environment and of environment policy in Jordan, as well as experiences of cooperation with the European Union. The questionnaire, filled out after the interviews, then turned more explicitly to rules and values externalized by the European Union, asking about the EU as an environmental actor in general, about the motivation and impact of the Union’s activities and the interviewees’ personal views on environmental matters. The analysis
and conclusion drawn relates to a large degree on the quantitative data and present preliminary results only.

4.2 General perception of EU as environmental actor

Reflecting the longstanding relations between the EU and Jordan in general and the rather fruitful cooperation in environmental issues, the overall perception of the EU as an important actor in global environmental politics is a good one. This is largely voiced in the interviews conducted with environmental experts, and is also reflected in the quantitative data: 75% of the respondents strongly agree with the notion of the EU as an important actor in global environmental politics, with the other 25% still ‘rather’ agreeing. Interestingly, these high numbers do not transfer to the idea of the EU as a global power in environmental politics as 12.5% even disagree with this idea. Two other characteristics of the EU have high agreement rates - the EU is seen as a unified actor (91.7% agree or strongly agree) and as a good example in environmental policy (95.8% agree or strongly agree). These two characteristics correlate quite highly with the EU as an important actor (Unified actor .480, good example .421, both highly significant), which shows the importance of unified action and setting a good example for the EU as an actor.

That the EU constitutes a good example also relates to the EU as a different model voiced by some experts interviewed. It was considered a model not only in environmental issues but in a way of governance in general as one expert pointed out: “And also it is special since the EU provides a model of governance, it is not only environmental, but it does put environment, peace issues, democracy, human rights in a context and provides a package for modernization in a country. This is really the added value of the EU’s involvement.” (Interview in Amman, 21.3.2011) This view corresponds to the theoretical concept of normative power, is, however, not consistently perceived by the interviewees. Often no difference between other actors, like the US, was perceived and at times the EU was reduced to a role as a donor agency. Overall, although the EU is predominantly seen as an important environmental actor, even environmental experts are not always aware of EU activities. This low visibility also applies to calls for participation or projects by the EU, who are often only known to few people who sometimes don’t share information as organizations are competing for funding (Interview in Amman, 10.4.2011).

Analyzing the negative aspects by the means of a factor analysis, three factors were extracted with a total explained variance of 73.6%. This first factor, correlating highly with a EU being morally superior, with environmental ideals contradicting the respondents’ own, the EU only talking about environmental issues and the EU pursuing its own recipe regardless of the Jordanian context, seems to relate to a view of normative-hegemonial behavior of the EU underlying the data analyzed. The second factor seems to relate to an economical motivation for the activities in environmental policy while the third factor seems to represent the view of the EU imposing rule with strategic interests.

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20 There is also a correlation (r=.380) with the perception of the EU as a credible example in environmental politics, but it is not highly significant (.067).
The negative notion of a normative-hegemonial European Union then correlates highly negatively with the statement that the environment in Jordan has profited from EU activities (-.687, highly significant). That means with a higher perception of the EU as a normative hegemon the perception of the EU being beneficial for the Jordanian environment declines. The result therefore suggests normative behavior as a very central variable in the success of EU, which will have to be further examined.

Table 1: Rotated Component Matrix of negative perceptions of EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rotated Component Matrix&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European recipe</td>
<td></td>
<td>.785</td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European talk</td>
<td></td>
<td>.790</td>
<td>.241</td>
<td>-.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green image</td>
<td></td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.777</td>
<td>.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules imposed</td>
<td></td>
<td>.170</td>
<td>-.132</td>
<td>.909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental ideals</td>
<td></td>
<td>.759</td>
<td>.344</td>
<td>-.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverup</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.173</td>
<td>.495</td>
<td>.697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economical motivation</td>
<td></td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.844</td>
<td>-.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morally superior</td>
<td></td>
<td>.856</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3 General perceptions of cooperation in environmental issues

The openness of the qualitative interviews also allows a glimpse into how the cooperation with the European Union is perceived by its Jordanian counterparts. Not all of the interviewees have had experience in working with the European Union and the mode of cooperation also varied according to the different role the EU plays in environmental policy – as a donor agency, as a provider of technical assistance, as an advisor in institutional and legal reforms. Overall, the perception of cooperation in the interviews was a good one, especially the experience of those experts who have cooperated with the EU in institutional reforms and technical assistance. This was, as the majority of the interviewees expressed, rather close and very beneficial, also on a personal level (Interview in Amman, 27.3.2011).

<sup>21</sup> The factor further correlates, although not significantly, with the notion of the EU as a good example, which supports the interpretation above ($t$= -.373, significance (2tail) .072).
A number of negative experiences were, however, also expressed in the interviews, the rigid EU bureaucracy being the issue voiced most often: “The other issue is the bureaucracy with the Union. Sometimes you get funds from the European Union, it takes years and people lose their momentum waiting.” (Interview in Amman, 12.4.2011). This negative experience was mainly articulated by experts working in civil society organizations or research institutes seeking funds from the EU. Another negative aspect voiced in the interviews by some experts was the perception that the EU had no concern for the cultural context (Interview in Amman, 29.3.2011) or focused on a regional cooperation and not concentrating enough on the Jordanian context: “We understand that there is this regionalization of the cooperation, which to a certain extent makes sense. [...] However, sometimes it really hinders the national prioritization [...] I think sometimes we fall short as national entities to understand regional concepts. Definitely when it comes to environment, there are no borders, no boundaries. But again, because we are not all of the same socio-economic standards, you will see Jordan needing something other than the other countries need.” (Interview in Amman, 27.3.2011). The quantitative data further supports this point as there is a quite high agreement (8.3% strong and 50% minor agreement) with the statement “It’s just the European recipe that the EU is following, regardless of the Jordanian context”.

There was, despite these negative aspects of cooperation, a widely expressed wish for more cooperation with the Union by the environmental expert. This is not as strongly represented in the quantitative data: while 83.3% of the respondents express their strong wish for more multilateral cooperation in general22, only 75% strongly wish for more EU-Jordanian cooperation in environmental issues.

4.4 Perception of EU values

Values are quite prominently featured in the questionnaire which included a detailed passage about the respondents’ personal views on environmental policies, including the main values promoted by the EU. Overall, the majority of the experts saw the acceptance of European values in Jordan with 83.3% in total, 33.3% strongly agreed to the acceptance of these values in Jordan. A further investigation if the values accepted indeed correlate with the personal values held by the environmental experts shows that this variable correlates highly negatively with the statement of EU not considering the respondent’s own environmental ideals (r= -.639) and statement of EU moral superiority (r= -.704). It is, of course, not possible to transfer these results into the general population in Jordan or even the political elite as it is suggested in the qualitative interview data that there is a low awareness of environmental issues at top and middle level in administration, including the Ministry of Environment (Interview in Amman, 10.4.2011). It supports, however, the legitimacy of analyzing environmental cooperation with a focus on values. It also points out one of the main shortcomings of Jordanian environmental policy – implementing and enforcing certain environmental values.

22 Focusing on the multilateral cooperation as a value of itself, the strong agreement rose to 95.8%.
The value most strongly supported was multilateralism (95.8% strong agreement), followed by the precautionary principle (91.7% strong agreement) and environmental integration as well as the polluter-pays principle (87.5% strong agreement). These main values are, however, not consistently correlated with each other, but through a factor analysis two factors underlying the data can be differentiated, which amount to 78.5% of the total variance. The first factor, correlating highly with agreement for the precautionary principle and environmental integration as well as negatively with the reversed statement on precautionary actions, can therefore be termed ‘EU values’ as these are the main principles the EU promotes in international environmental politics. The second factor is high on multilateralism, the polluter pays principle and pollution to be combatted at its source and therefore represents more ‘international values’ since they are internationally widely consented and adopted principles.

Table 2: Rotated Component Matrix of values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rotated Component Matrixa</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More international co-operation</td>
<td>-.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polluter pays</td>
<td>-.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source combatted</td>
<td>.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action after occurrence</td>
<td>-.764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precaution</td>
<td>.841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental integration</td>
<td>.973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlating these two factors with the question of whether the Jordanian environment has benefitted from EU activities, there was a higher relation (although with .093 not highly significant) with EU values. This, therefore, underlines the importance of the perception of EU values for the perceived benefit for the Jordanian environment. This can also be taken as an indicator for the EU’s success in promoting its main principles.

In the interviews, the majority of the experts saw the integration of environmental policy in Jordan problematic, although 87.5% strongly agreed that environmental issues should be considered when making decisions in other policy fields. This, as pointed out earlier, directs to a gap between environmental experts questioned and relevant decision-makers. Another issue is quite interesting, since the value of environmental integration is associated with the other EU values (see factor analysis), the statement “The integration of environmental policy into other policy fields in the EU works just fine” does not reach more
than $\frac{1}{6}$ (16.7%) of strong agreement, 12.5% even disagreeing. This result seems to indicate that EU values are widely accepted and perceived to be important, but the EU not adhering to all of their ‘own’ values. The agreement (25% of minor and 4.2% of major agreement) to the EU talking about environment but not acting seems to support this interpretation.

Trying to examine why and how EU values came to be so widely accepted among the Jordanian experts interviewed, the qualitative interview data hinted at the experience with the European Union to be influential: “Actually, my passion is about environmental mainstreaming. I was introduced with the concept when I was working with the European Commission projects and I really believe that any success for the environment should come from working with other sectors.” (Interview in Amman, 27.3.2011). There is some support in the quantitative data for the notion of EU values promoted through experience with the EU, but it is neither very high nor very robust. The only indication in favor of this notion is the (insignificant) relation between EU experience and a perceived moral superiority of the EU ($r = -0.368$), which can be interpreted as with growing EU experience, the perception of moral superiority of the EU declines. There is evidence, however, that the perception of EU values being accepted correlates (tough not significantly with .090) positively with the view of the EU as a good example.

### 4.5 Perception of EU rules

Cooperation between Jordan the European Union in the legal and institutional setting was rather extensive, which was also reflected in the expert interviews and the experiences they shared. While the regulative framework was not seen as problematic, a number of experts were, however, quite hesitant about the success of institutional cooperation. There seems to be no consistent understanding of the role of the ministries in general as there are no common understandings of governance processes (Interview in Amman, 10.4.2011). The situation is quite contrary, as expressed in a number of interviews, since environmental policy is highly dependent on personal factors: The relationship between the government (ministries) and civil society depends highly on personal factors like interest, contacts, dedication. This also applies to the processes inside of governmental institutions.

At other times, regulations and procedures promoted by the European Union have indeed been accepted in Jordanian environmental policy, such as Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA), but are not precisely implemented and subsequent monitoring is lacking: “It is not the regulations but the implementation.” (29.3.2011).

Wishes for more cooperation on monitoring and in general more support in the institutional setting have been expressed by a number of experts, the EU is however quite hesitant, especially in terms of monitoring. This is due to the EU not wanting to interfere with internal issues, one of the interview partners pointed out (Interview in Amman, 21.3.2011). The EU is rather perceived to perform an advisory function and thus promot-

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22 The correlation between the two variables is only $r = 0.029$ which indicates no relation.

23
ing EU procedures as one expert illustrates: “However, sometimes, if you don’t have the direction clear in your mind [...] the EU would come and say ‘there is something called SEA\textsuperscript{24} and it’s mandatory in the European Commission.’ Now it's up to you to say that you want to explore it and see if it would work in Jordan or not. But I don't see it them imposing it on me.” (Interview in Amman, 27.3.2011). In the majority of the interviews, therefore, experts did not perceive any pressure to adapt to EU rules at all, mainly due to the advisory role of the EU and the integrative approach that involved counterparts in Jordan and support them by capacity building. In that respect, as was pointed out, EU projects differ from that of other donor agencies in terms of anchoring implementation in Jordanian institutions (Interview in Amman, 27.3.2011). This is, however, not completely reflected in the quantitative data, as only 50% disagree with the statement “It is problematic that the EU imposes rules on the partner countries”. This might be related to some requirements for funding that were perceived negatively as they are not sensitive to the cultural context of Jordan (Interview in Amman, 12.4.2011).

4.6 Perceived impact of EU in Jordan

Also of interest in both theoretical concepts was the impact of the European Union. Therefore, this is the last aspect analyzed in the empirical part. Overall, 87.5% (41.7% strong agreement) of the interviewees agreed that the environment in Jordan has profited from the EU’s activities. This perception is then highly correlated to the perception of EU values being accepted in Jordan ($r=.703$). However, this does not relate to any EU impact on environmental policy in Jordan as the relation is not significant, neither with values accepted nor with environment profited.

Analyzing the perceived impact of the European Union more closely, a factor analysis was conducted. With a total of 76.2% three factors were extracted. The first one, correlating highly with values accepted and new issues that the EU raised, could be summed under the term ‘impact of values’, while the second one correlates with EU raising standards, changing the discussion and form of participation will be termed ‘impact of discussion’. The third factor, relating to the perception of rules being imposed and the EU addressing unimportant problems, is negative and is therefore termed ‘Impact not beneficial’. A short correlation with the overall perception of benefit for environment shows the highly positive correlations between this variable and the first two factors (for impact of values $r=.539$, for impact of discussion $r=.421$), and a highly negative correlation ($r=-.421$) with the third one. This result therefore underlines the centrality of values for the impact the EU is perceived to have on the Jordanian environment.

\textsuperscript{24} Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA).
Table 3: Rotated Component Matrix of impacts of the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rotated Component Matrix&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values accepted</td>
<td>.843</td>
<td>.268</td>
<td>-.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards raised</td>
<td>.582</td>
<td>.640</td>
<td>-.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New issues</td>
<td>.930</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>-.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion changed</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.833</td>
<td>.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules imposed</td>
<td>-.407</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>.558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unimportant problems</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-.197</td>
<td>.899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation of organizations</td>
<td>.176</td>
<td>.840</td>
<td>-.261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attempting to explain the perceived impact of the EU, the concept of EU external governance suggested networking and thus professional or informal contact and experience with the EU to be an influential factor (see network model of EU external governance). As shown above, some supporting evidence was found in the qualitative data, but there was no additional evidence found in the quantitative data, where experience with the EU does not have a significant relation with the perception in general or perception of the EU’s impact. Even when the EU experience is divided more precisely between EU experience in institutional cooperation and EU experience in project cooperation as perceptions of the cooperation with the Union in the qualitative interviews suggested, there is no (significant) relation. There is also no correlation between the type of experience with the EU and the perceived benefit for the Jordanian environment. Neither did the country of study of the experts interviewed in any kind have a significant relation to the benefit experts perceived from EU action in Jordan. Therefore, the main explanatory variable that is often proposed in the literature does not seem to have a straightforward explanatory value in this case study. These results do not directly indicate the insignificance of contact or experience with the Union for the interviewees’ perception of the Union in general and its impact in Jordan, as there is ample evidence in the qualitative interviews. The results show, on the other hand, that the European Union is rather successful in making an impact perceived even by those who did neither cooperate directly with the EU nor studied there. Therefore, it is necessary for a more elaborated analysis of the data to look for further variables that might explain the differences in the perception of the EU and its impact more consistently.

Using a multiple regression model an attempt is made to explain and quantify the variance in the perception of EU as beneficial to Jordanian environment: dependent variable: perception of environment profited from EU activities, independent variables: EU as important actor, perception of EU values being accepted and perception of EU rules being impost. The variation in perceptions on the environment profiting is explained to a quite high degree of 60.6% by the variation of the three independent variables. The perception
of EU rule imposition is the least robust and the lowest factor of influence. It is also negative, meaning that with higher agreement to the EU imposing rules, the agreement of EU activities being beneficial to Jordan is decreasing.

Table 4: Model summary and coefficients of EU impact (dep. variable)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Summary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Model summary and coefficients of EU impact (dep. variable)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficientsa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 (Constant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values accepted</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rules imposed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant is the perception of the EU as an important actor, which has a considerable positive influence on the dependent variable. The highest influence on the perception of the environment profiting from EU activities is the acceptance of EU values. This underlines the centrality of values for the activities of the EU in environmental policy.

The empirical data therefore suggests that the notion of the EU externalizing its values if quite important on how the EU is perceived in general (as an important actor in environmental politics) and the perception of the impact on environment (Jordanian environment profited from EU activities).
5 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EU EXTERNALIZING ITS VALUES AND RULES – CONCLUSION

The paper has argued that an external perspective on the EU externalizing its values and rules is of added value and promises insights into how the EU as an actor and its impact are perceived by recipient countries. The analysis of the qualitative and quantitative data supports this argumentation and underlines the importance of capturing the notion of the EU externalizing its values and rules.

The externalization of EU rules is not as clear in the quantitative data as it is suggested in the theoretical concept of EU external governance. In the qualitative data, this aspect was more pronounced. While there is evidence for a positive perception of the EU externalizing its rules in environmental policy, the success seems to be a different matter as the a number of deficiencies in the environmental institutions of Jordan are showing, such as the lack of regulated processes within the institutions, lack of awareness of top and middle level administration and the gap in implementation. There is evidence, however, that the main underlying problem is the low priority of environmental policy. Despite the increase in relevance of this policy field for EU-Jordanian cooperation, it is still periphery topic of collaboration, which then translates into the Jordanian priority system of policy fields as well.

Regarding the externalization of EU values, the case study is clearer. The analysis of the data showed that EU values are perceived to be well accepted by Jordanian environmental experts and that the acceptance of these values has a strong influence on how the impact of EU activities on the Jordanian environment is seen. There is also a strong relation between the perception of EU values accepted and the perception of the EU as an important actor in environmental politics in general. And while the notion of a normative hegemon EU is problematic for the perception of the EU as an actor, this is a minor one with little overall consequence.

Considering the gap between the state of environmental policy perceived by Jordanian environmental experts and the personal views of those experts regarding environmental values, one can point out that, the mere externalization of EU rules and values does not guarantee their implementation, even if the rules and values are accepted and shared by a group of specialists or experts. Therefore, more research has to be done regarding the relation between rule adoption and rule application as the main gap seems to be located here. In the end, both concepts seem to point out that more research on how the EU is perceived is of interest.

Before hesitantly formulating concluding remarks on the ability of the EU to externalize its model, a number of methodological shortcomings have to be considered: First, the interviews were conducted on a voluntary basis so that only experts interested in this topic were questioned. This might lead to results that are actually overemphasizing the positive perception and reception of environmental values in Jordan, especially in regards to the institutions as civil society organizations tend to be more interested in their field of work. Second, the sample size is very small, an empirical study with a larger number might be advisable. Third, the case study was not able to consistently explain how EU values became accepted among the experts interviewed since contact or experience with the EU
was not found to be a consistent factor of influence in the data. Therefore, a more detailed analysis of the case study of Jordan has to be done and an additional case study in a different (southern Mediterranean) country is advisable.

Is EU able to externalize its model? There is some indication that this indeed is the case. Environmental experts in Jordan have apparently accepted a number of rules and values. A number of obstacles remain, however, on the way towards an effective environmental policy. The European Union has, if it is true to its claim as a global and regional environmental actor, two choices it seems: Either it monitors implementation and enforcement of institutional reforms very closely, which might, however, give way to the perception of the European Union imposing rules and thus losing some of the positive perception as a good example and normative power. Or the EU raises the priority of environmental policy in its cooperation through positive incentives that will also affect the priorities in the recipient country and might even improve the perception of the Union as a good example in environmental policy.
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